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During a Jan. 8 news conference in Washington, linking reporters in European cities and Montreal
by satellite, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams said that while
the contras cannot win the war against the Sandinista government, they may force the latter to
the negotiating table. Abrams reiterated the Reagan administration's justification for contra aid:
"The process of negotiation can succeed only through the pressure which the contras put on
the Sandinista government. Without that pressure the Sandinistas won't negotiate and won't
compromise." He said members of both parties in Congress now recognize the Sandinistas as
a threat to US security. Consequently, he added, problems in obtaining additional money for
the contras are not expected. Abrams claimed efforts by the Contadora Group were deadlocked,
partly because South American governments were trying to force concessions from the four
Central American democracies instead of trying "to crack the tough nut" of Nicaragua. Selected
questions presented by reporters and Abrams' answers follow: Q: Don't you think there is a growing
impatience in Central and Latin America regarding the deadlock [in negotiations]? Due to this
growing impatience, don't you see a danger of new peace initiatives contradicting American
goals and objectives in Central America? Abrams: I think there is more than impatience...there is
tremendous fear of Nicaragua, of this heavily armed communist regime...[T]here is always a danger,
not from Central America, but from South America, from Contadora, of unwise compromises with
the Sandinistas, an effort to sign anything...that calls itself a peace treaty. But I do not think you will
see that from Central America. Their necks are on the line, those four democracies...[I]f a bad peace
treaty is signed, it is their national security and their freedom which is at stake. So while they are
impatient and worried, they are not inclined to sign something that does not protect their interests.
Q: How do you think the present composition of the US Congress and Irangate will or will not
weaken the present... objectives of the administration in Central America? Abrams: If we had been
asked whether we prefer to have maintained Republican control of the Senate, we would not have
had to hesitate in answering that question. This whole scandal also is a problem, but is a problem
whose seriousness is exaggerated. If you look at why the Democratic House of Representatives
last year approved aid to the contras, they recite why. They say, `Nicaraguan subversion of its
neighbors; Nicaragua's aggression; Nicaragua's support for terrorism; the internal repression,
the Cubans and Soviets'...All that is still true. Republicans and Democrats...still have to confront
what is for us a real national security problem, a second Cuba, this time on the mainland of the
Americas...Those Senators and Congressmen have to go home, and they have to tell the voters what
they did about the question of a second Cuba on the mainland of the Americas. Q: [In reference to
the joint mission by Contadora and Support Group foreign ministers and the secretaries general of
the UN and OAS scheduled for Jan. 16-20...], such a joint mission could propose the establishment
of a multi-national observer force to monitor troop movements along the Nicaraguan and Honduran
frontier. What would be the position of the US government on such a proposal? Abrams: You will
never achieve peace in Central America by picking up one little thing here and another little thing
there. The road to peace lies through democracy. Don't give up on democracy in Nicaragua. Do
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not abandon the people of Nicaragua to communism; that will not produce peace. They will go
on fighting. They will go on fighting forever because they don't want to live as part of the Soviet
empire... The answer is to get the Sandinistas to have free elections and freedom of speech and
freedom of expression and freedom of movement...There is no military answer. There is a political
answer, and it is democracy. Q: You mentioned the need to pressure Nicaragua to stop aggression
and subversion in other countries. Could you mention some recent and well-proven examples
for such subversion and aggression? Abrams: Well, I can't give you details because that would be
revealing classified information. I don't know of anybody in the US Congress who really thinks
anymore that [the Sandinistas] are not supporting the FMLN in El Salvador. We know for a fact
that they are also supporting the communist guerrillas in Guatemala and Honduras and Costa Rica.
We know for a fact about their support of the M-19 in Colombia. None of this is new. They just
invaded Honduras six weeks ago...The question is: what is to be done about it? That is the issue. Q:
Why has the US government refused to participate in bilateral negotiations with Nicaragua since
1982? Abrams: Our position on this is crystal clear...Secretary Shultz went to Managua. We had nine
rounds of discussions with the government of Nicaragua...And we said to them at the outset, `If you
try to use these as a substitute for Contadora and refuse to negotiate with your neighbors and with
the people of Nicaragua, then we will cut them off.' That is exactly what the Sandinistas did...So we
[stopped] those talks... The day that the Sandinistas agree to sit down with the democratic resistance
forces...we sit down with the Sandinistas. The Sandinistas don't want to do that. Q: The position
of the United States toward the contras is well known. What is the position of the United States
towards the civilian opposition in Nicaragua since some leaders... oppose the Sandinistas [but
are also] opposed to US funding of the contras? Abrams: We believe in democratic politick. And
therefore, we are strongly supportive of anybody attempting to engage in free democratic politics in
Nicaragua, including all of the opposition groups, whether we happen to agree with their particular
policies or not... If I can engage here in a criticism of Europe. I don't think you support them strongly
enough... Support from us might well hurt them because the government of Nicaragua will then
say, `You see? They are all involved with the contras.' But you can do it. You government and your
political parties can support the democratic political opposition in Nicaragua... Q: As far as President
Reagan's policy toward Nicaragua is concerned, the President now has less than two years to bring
his crusade to a happy end. Do you estimate that the Sandinista government...has any chance to
survive the president's mandate? Abrams: There are variables. The level of Soviet and Cuban aid,
for example, is a variable which is not under US control and which has a lot to do with the survival
of that regime. Secondly, Congress. What is the [future] level of assistance given by Congress to the
[contras]?...I would say that if the current US policy is maintained, it seems to me the Sandinistas
will not survive. Either they will be forced to compromise, [or] the Nicaraguan people will rise up
and get rid of them, just as the Nicaraguan people got rid of...the Somoza dictatorship. Q: It seems
that so far the contras have not been able to gain the support of the local populations in the regions
bordering Honduras and Costa Rica. How do you explain this situation? Abrams: Absolutely wrong.
I can't prove what I am going to say to you and you can't prove the contrary here on a television
show. But first, there are no elections in those areas; so we don't really know...Do you know that in
those areas where the contras have been most active over the years...the Sandinistas move people
out forcibly...? I think that is a clear indication that there is tremendous popular support. And why
not? Name me a country in which the people have freely chosen communism... Q: What does the
American government really expect from the contras, representing a political world which is going
to disappear [throughout] Latin America? I believe that the contras are something coming from the
older political system in Nicaragua. Abrams: You are wrong. The leaders of the contras are... Cruz,
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Calero, and Robelo. Cruz was a member of the Sandinista government...Robelo was a member of the
Sandinista I should say the kind of united front government which succeeded Somoza a long time.
Calero was jailed by Somoza. So the contra forces let us say 15,000 have an average age of about
18 or 19 or 20. They are Somocistas? How old were they when Somoza was in power? Thirteen?
This is nonsense. The people of Nicaragua started to rise up. This is the largest and fastest-growing
insurgency I can think of in the world...And it is for a very simple reason. It had nothing to do with
Somoza. The people of Nicaragua don't want communism. Nobody has ever chosen communism
freely... Q: You said before that the Nicaraguan people hate the Sandinista government. It seems
to me there is not enough to confirm this. There are not mass demonstrations, nothing like that...in
the streets of Managua. How do you know, did you take a poll, for example? Abrams: How do
you know what popular opinion is in Hungary? I think I know that the people of Hungary want
democracy, not communism. I cannot prove it to you. How many mass demonstrations have there
been recently in Hungary or Czechoslovakia?...You have to understand that the people of Nicaragua
are dealing with a new, now consolidating communist secret police system. The reason those Czechs
and East Germans and Cuban secret police people are there is to train a new communist secret
police apparatus. If you read the reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the
OAS or of the International League for Human Rights, which is the oldest US human rights group,
they will tell you about secret prisons and murder and torture by the government of Nicaragua.
So people in Nicaragua know what happens when you rise up and demonstrate...If you do a little
bit, you may lose your ration coupon and then your children starve. If you do more than that, then
you disappear one day. Maybe you turn up a few days later simply having been beaten or having
had your children threatened. Why do you think there are hundreds of thousands of refugees
from Nicaragua? Why are all these people fleeing Nicaragua? If the government of Nicaragua has
widespread popular support why does it shut down Radio Catolica? Why does it expel Bishop
Vega? Why does it close down La Prensa? Why does it have a state of emergency which destroys
civil liberties?... That...government knows it has no popular support. That is why they are being so
repressive. Just like every communist government, they all know they have no popular support... Q:
Switzerland, like many other European nations, is giving assistance to Nicaragua for humanitarian
and development projects. What is your opinion on this assistance? Abrams: If you are going to
give aid to Nicaragua, we hope that you very carefully look... at where the aid is going to be sure
that it is purely and exclusively humanitarian, that it does not go to so-called communal farms that
in fact are military bases. Q: If a negotiated solution is not found in Central America, is American
military intervention a likelihood or only a possibility? Abrams: I think that if no compromise is
found, the people of Nicaragua will rise up, as they rose up in 1979, to destroy their most recent
dictatorship. I think there are as happened under President Kennedy times when the United States
might be forced to prevent Soviet intervention by using its own military power...What I see...is that
this hated communist regime is going to have to deal with the people of Nicaragua. If it refuses,
if its only answer to the people is repression, they are going to get rid of it. Q: How do you think
history will judge the eight years of Reagan policy in Central America? Abrams: I think the Reagan
legacy will be first to have supported the creation of democracies and the sustenance of those
democracies...and secondly, to have supported the people of Nicaragua in their struggle for freedom
against communism, [and] that this struggle will succeed.
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